who, from the late 1980s onward, exploited these sentiments. Further explanations are reliant upon attempting to locate decline and fall within the context of the wider collapse of communism, while others point to the hidden hand of the West, or even the machinations of the Vatican and Berlin, intent on re-enforcing Catholic and German hegemony respectively.
Of course, the reader is entitled to conclude that even such an unpromising set of circumstances should not lead people toward estrangement, violence, and indeed warfare. Of course, in the best of all possible worlds, they would be correct. However, in the 1980s Yugoslavia was not the best of all possible worlds. On the contrary, it was a one-party dictatorship suff ering from economic decline. Th is downturn was coupled with a wider pattern of uneven economic development, diff erentiated and uneven levels of education, a general lack of Yugoslav national consciousness, and the lingering eff ects of the 1941-1945 civil war. Th e historical memory of the competing visions of Yugoslavia that arose during the nineteenth century and the failure to solve those tensions, as opposed merely to suppressing them, can also be added to the mix.
Th ere does seem to be a general consensus among serious commentators, however, that the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' argument is rubbish, and that warfare was the result of elite manipulation. I intend to present a heretical stance. Whilst I do not believe that bloodshed was inevitable, I believe it was always likely to be integral to the process, and whereas I do not subscribe to the 'ancient hatreds' argument, I do take the view that signifi cant sections of Yugoslav society had for decades been deeply estranged from each other prior to the initial outbreak of violence in Knin in November 1990. Fundamentally, I do not subscribe to arguments that suggest or claim that Yugoslavia was a multicultural society, in broadly the same sense that countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom are, or aspire to be.
Space does not permit me to investigate Yugoslav inter-ethnic relationships on a case by case basis. However, having claimed that Yugoslavia was not a multicultural society, I am aware of the need to attempt to substantiate the claim. Let us fi rst of all examine the wider context of Muslim-Christian relationships. A Christian identity, albeit not necessarily a liberal one, is integral to the majority of South Slav national movements and to the adherents of those movements and the nations they have spawned. It does not matter that self-proclaimed Christians may not rigorously adhere to the tenets of their faith or take a particularly 'Christian' view of their Muslim neighbours or, indeed, other Christians. Th e fact of the matter is that they identify themselves as Christians and either Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Serbs and
